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This paper examines the major causes of Iran’s unemployment conundrum using a
simultaneous-equation model and annual time series data from 1968 to 2000. It is found that
the rate of unemployment responds positively to output gap and increasing economic
uncertainty and negatively to the higher growth rates of real investment and inflation,
supporting the view that there exists a degree of trade-off between inflation and unemployment.
However, since persistent and soaring inflation rates eventually lead to the chronic depreciation
of the domestic currency and rising economic instability, it will be irrational to exploit this tradeoff to fight against unemployment, particularly in the post-1979 revolution. Iran possesses one
of the youngest populations in the world with approximately 40 per cent of its population less
than 15 years. It is thus argued that if major tax and constitutional reforms are not undertaken,
unemployment will continue to rise, depicting a sombre future for the next working age
generation.

1. Introduction
According to the Central Bank (2002), Iran’s total population was 63.9 million in 2000. Unlike
the previous two development plans conducted after the 1979 Islamic revolution, the most
important concern of the recent Third Five-Year Development Plan (2000/01-2004/05) pertains
to a growing rate of unemployment among youth. Political and religious leaders zealously
supported a totally inappropriate policy of population growth after the 1979 revolution,
particularly in the 1980s. This population policy was abandoned during the last decade but
population continues to grow due to its momentum and dynamic nature. Population growth
decelerated from 3.9 per cent in 1986 to 1.7 per cent in 2000.
The population pyramid in Iran is such that a large proportion of population will seek
employment within the next five years or so because the economy has one of the youngest
populations in the world with approximately 40 per cent under 15 years of age (Amuzegar,
2000). That is the reason why the population pyramid in Iran is literally referred to as a “time
bomb”. During the period 1996-2000 on average only 296,250 new jobs were created each year,
whereas over the same period on average 692,750 new job seekers entered the labour market
(Management and Planning Organisation, MPO, 2000, p.21). According to the Third Plan it is
predicted that over the next five years on average every year between 750,000 to 800,000 people
will be seeking employment. If the economy performs like it has been in the past five years,
approximately half a million people will be added to the total mass of unemployed workers each
year (Valadkhani, 2001).
The major objective of the Third Plan is to achieve a GDP growth of at least six per cent
per annum in order to keep the rate of unemployment under control. Real GDP at factor price on
average grew only 3.5 per cent per annum over the last five years (1996-2000) or even during
the last decade (1991-2000) when Iran exported $US 150.5 billion worth of petrodollars (MPO,
2000). The Iranian government in the Third Plan wants to accomplish this policy target through
heavy reliance on private sector investment. This paper examines the major determinants of
unemployment conundrum, which is currently regarded as the most crucial issue in Iran.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 a theoretical model is postulated
which specifies a dynamic equation for unemployment within a simultaneous equations system.
The empirical econometric results as well as policy implications of the study are presented in
Section 3. Some concluding remarks will follow in Section 4.

2. Theoretical Model
To the best of the author’s knowledge, with the exception of the Heiat (1986) model, the
Valadkhani (1997) model, and a recent macroeconometric model developed in the Management
and Planning Organisation (MPO, 2001), none of the previous studies has modelled
employment or unemployment in Iran. Heiat (1986) simply specifies employment as a function
of investment. Valadkhani (1997) formulates aggregate employment as a function of total labour
force and GDP. His estimates indicate that, ceteris paribus, if total labour force increases by
1000 persons, aggregate employment will increase by only 770 persons. Put otherwise, 230
persons (23 per cent) who have just entered the labour market will be out of work. On the other
hand, the MPO (2001) model estimates the demand for various categories of labour as well as
several participation rates for male and female groups. Then they calculate the rate of
unemployment from the “employment module” of the MPO macroeconometric model.
Given that rising unemployment is such an important issue in the Iranian economy, the
objective of this paper is to specify an equation for the rate of unemployment as follows:
ln(U t ) = β10 + β11Δ ln( Pt ) + β12 [ln(Yt ) − ln(Yt p )] + β13 ln( BtP ) + β14 Δ ln( I t ) + β15 ln(U t −1 ) + β16 D + ε1t
(1)
Where U is the annual rate of unemployment; P denotes the consumer price index (1982=1);
G=ln(Y)-ln(Yp), is a measure of output gap; Y is actual real output (GDP at 1982 constant prices)
and Yp is a measure of potential output; BP is the difference between the black market exchange
rate (the price of $US in Iranian rial) and the official exchange rate or the black market premium
as a proxy for economic uncertainty; I is total investment (at 1982 constant prices) and D is an
intercept dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the Iraqi war (1980-1988) period, and zero
otherwise. Theoretical justifications for the explanatory variables on the right hand side of
equation (1) are presented below.
First, due to several factors such as the 1979 revolution, the US sanctions, and the eight
years war with the belligerent Iraqi regime, it is plausible to argue that the Iranian economy has
been performing below its full potential capacity, particularly since 1979. The rate of
unemployment has not dropped below 10 per cent since 1968 and peaked at 16.7 per cent in
1985. According to an official estimate by the MPO (2001), the unemployment rate was more
than 14 per cent in the year 2000. With such a high and persistent rate of unemployment one
can argue that Iran suffers mainly from structural unemployment. One way of explaining
unemployment is to use the Phillips curve. Figure 1 presents two Phillips curves (the first one
representing the pre-1979 revolution period and the second curve representing the post-1979
revolution era) by plotting the unemployment rate versus the rate of inflation using annual
time series data.
Due to substantial oil price rises and subsequent supply shocks worldwide in the
1968-1978 period, particularly in 1974, the Phillips curve in the upper part of Figure 1 shows
an overall upward slope as if the curve has shifted to the right. However, the Phillips curve in
the post-1979 period clearly exhibits a downward slope, supporting the view that, to some
extent, there is a likelihood of trade-off between unemployment and inflation in this period.
Given that there have been times when inflation and unemployment have moved in the same
direction, the simplistic Phillips curve model is inadequate in explaining Iran’s
unemployment problem and One need to augment this model with a number of other relevant
factors, which are discussed below.
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Figure1. The Phillips curve before and after the 1979
Islamic Revolution
Pre-1979 revolution Period (1968-1978)
30

Inflation (%)

25
20
15
U=10.9+0.05Inf

10
5
0
10.0

10.5

11.0

11.5

12.0

12.5

Unemployment (%)

Post-1979 revolution Period (1979-2000)

50

Inflation (%)

40

30

U=15.6-0.10Inf

20

10

0
8

10

12

14

16

18

Unemployment (%)

Source: Table 1.

These additional explanatory variables are incorporated into the unemployment equation to
address the instability of the Phillips curve, a phenomenon, which is referred to as stagflation
in the relevant literature. For a detailed discussion of the source of stagflation in Iran see
Bahmani-Oskooee (1996). Therefore, it is hypothesised that there should be a reasonable tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, particularly in the post-1979 revolution era. If the
coefficient for β11 is significant and negative, one can contend that the Phillips curve hypothesis
does apply in the context of Iran.
One may argue that under inflationary circumstances labour unions feel that real wages
decrease, thus they demand higher nominal wages. The capitalists respond to this increase in
nominal wages by raising prices. As a result of this ongoing procedure a wage-price spiral will
persist. However, labour unions do not have a determining role in the Iranian economy and it
appears that labour unrest was not the cause of inflation, but a response to it (Dadkhah 1988).
The NAIRO (nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment) model is also highly unlikely
to apply in the context of Iran because the unemployment rate has never dropped below 10
per cent since 1968. The natural rate of unemployment is usually defined around five per cent
in most developed countries. This means that a five percent unemployment rate is tantamount
to full employment, but in Iran the rate of unemployment never reached this level. According
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to the 1996 census more than 50 per cent of Iran’s population were below 19 years of age,
therefore given such a massive pool of growing labour force and unemployed population and
other idle resources, a decline in unemployment should not give a rise to higher inflation. The
degree of capital utilisation was about 40 per cent at the end of the 1980s (Amuzegar, 1992, p.
420).
Second, following Fahrer and Pease (1993) and Nguyen and Siriwardana (1988), a
measure of output gap has also been included in the unemployment function. These two
Australian studies have estimated forms of the Okun’s law, where the rate of unemployment is
specified, inter alia, as a function of the percentage gap between actual and potential output.
One expects that if actual output becomes less than potential output, the rate of unemployment
should increase, supporting the view that β12>0. It should be noted that data on various aspects
of labour markets in Iran are scarce and of poor quality. For example annual time series data on
the number of hours worked are not available and as a result it is not possible to measure the
impact of labour productivity changes on the unemployment rate.
The potential output is calculated by employing the Hodrick and Prescott (HP, 1997)
filter that is widely used in the literature to decompose a time series into trend and cycle as
well as the computation of potential output (Yp). See for example de Brouwer (1998) and
Haltmaier (2001). The two-sided linear HP method estimates the potential output (YP) from
actual output Y by minimizing the variance of Y around Yp. More specifically, the HP filter sets
the potential component of output in order to minimise the following loss function:
L = ∑ t =1 (Yt − Yt p ) 2 + λ ∑ t = 2 ⎡⎣(Yt +p1 + Yt p ) − (Yt p − Yt −p1 ) ⎤⎦
T

T −1

2

(2)

where λ is the smoothing weight on potential output growth and T is the sample size.
Because of the use of annual time series data in this paper, I have followed de
Brouwer (1998) and assumed that λ=100. In an iterative process the HP filter sets the potential
component of output or Yp to minimise the loss function or L as shown in equation (2). It
should be noted that as λ approaches zero, potential output would converge to actual output.
Therefore a lower smoothing factor (λ) generates a ‘smaller’ estimate of the gap. One
advantage of the HP filter is that it makes the output gap stationary using a wide range of
smoothing values (Hodrick and Prescott 1997) and it also allows the trend to vary through
time. However, Brouwer (1998, p.7) points out that the HP filter also has “the distinct
disadvantage that the selection of the smoothing weight is arbitrary, and that this matters to
the estimate.”
Third, a volatile and uncertain economic environment adversely affects
unemployment. A large number of seemingly employed people in Iran’s large cities engaged
in "unproductive" activities in various service sectors. This portion of the labour force is
largely involved in small retail and itinerant petty trade, which is termed "rent-seeking" by
Karshenas and Pesaran (1995) and Farzin (1995). In order to capture economic uncertainty
and the adverse impact of these unproductive activities on the “official” and recorded
unemployment figures, the black market premium has been used as a proxy in the
unemployment function with an expected positive coefficient. The black market premium
defined as the difference between the black market exchange rate and the official exchange
rate. Not only does this measure reflect the over-valuation of the national currency, it also
captures economic instability. In other words, it is assumed that the impact of economic
uncertainty on unemployment can be captured by an unstable and constantly depreciating
domestic currency. The black market premium has been included in the unemployment
equation with an expected positive coefficient. It is important to note that according to
Bahmani-Oskooee (1996, p.609) “massive depreciation of the Iranian rial is one of the
sources of Iran’s current stagflation”.
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The fourth determinant of the rate of unemployment is the real growth of total
investment. Given that unemployment in Iran is structural, it is expected that a rise in the real
growth of investment can lead to a fall in the unemployment rate. As mentioned earlier
according to the Iran’s Third Plan, investment should grow more than 8.5 per cent per annum
in order to stabilise the rate of unemployment. It is thus expected that a positive growth in
real investment can assuage unemployment or β14<0. Fifth, an adaptive expectation
mechanism has also been incorporated by including ln(Ut-1) in equation (1). Finally, an
intercept war dummy variable is also included in equation (1) to capture the adverse effect of
the eight years war with Iraq on unemployment.
Due to the simultaneity problem between U and the explanatory variables (inflation,
economic growth, and investment growth) on the right hand side of equation (1), the
unemployment equation is estimated by both OLS and 2SLS (two stage least square) within
the following simultaneous equations system:
⎧ln(U t ) = β10 + β11Δ ln( Pt ) + β12 [ln(Yt ) − ln(Yt p )] + β13 ln( BPt ) + β14 Δ ln( I t ) + β15 ln(U t −1 ) + β16 D + ε 1t
⎪
⎪⎪ Δ ln( Pt ) = β 20 + β 21Δ ln( M 2t ) + β 22 Δ ln(Yt − OVt ) + β 23Tt + ε 2 t
⎨ Δ ln(Yt ) = β 30 + β 31Δ ln(OVt ) + β 32 Δ ln( I t ) + β 33 Δ ln( M 2t / Pt ) + β 34 Δ ln( Pt −1 ) + ε 3t
⎪
1
⎪ Δ ln( I ) = β + β
t
40
4 i ∑ Δ ln(Yt − i ) + ε 4 t
⎪⎩
i =0

where M2 is the broadest measure of liquidity in Iran, OV denotes the value added (at 1982
constant prices) in the oil sector, T is a trend variable and εij are stochastic residuals.
It should be noted that the specification of this system has been finalised after an
iterative transition between the alternative theoretical justifications and the empirical results.
For example given the lack of the data on interest rate in Iran, the total investment function (the
fourth equation above) innitially included the inflation rate as a proxy for the nominal rate of
interest but this variable was not statistically significant and consequently it was excluded
from the investment equation. Also the exclusion of the oil sector value added from GDP in the
inflation equation is supported by the work undertaken by Aghvli and Sassanpour (1982) for the
Iranian economy. Using a small multi-equation econometric model, emphasising the relationship
between inflation and the oil sector, they conclude that a booming oil sector can induce
inflationary pressures in other sectors of the economy. Given that the expected sign on the non-oil
GDP is negative (e.g. β22), GDP including of the oil sector, is an inappropriate explanatory
variable in this context. The appropriate measure is GDP exclusive of the oil sector. See
Valadkhani (1997) for a detailed theoretical specification of the similar equations embedded in an
Iranian macroeconometric model.
As seen, there are only four endogenous variables and nine predetermined variables in
the system. According to the rank and order conditions (not reported here but available from
the autor upon request) all the four equations specified within the system are overidetified and
thus one can estimate these equations by 2SLS to obtain consistent estimators.
3. Empirical Results and Policy Implications
Table 1 presents sources and descriptions of the data employed as well as the computed
summary statistics using annual time series data from 1968 to 2000. An important step before
estimating equation (1) is to determine the time series properties of the data. This is an
important issue since the use of non-stationary data can result in spurious regression results.
To this end, the ADF test has been adopted to examine the stationarity, or otherwise, of the
time series data.
The empirical results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF, 1979, 1981) test have not
been reported here but are available from the author upon request. According to the ADF test
results, all the variables employed in equation (1), i.e. ln(U), Δln(P), ln(BP), Δln(I) and G, are
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I(0). Since only 33 annual observations are used in the estimation process (1968-200), the
unit root test results should be taken with a pinch of salt, as all these tests are appropriate for
large samples.

Table 1. Summary statistics and description of the data employed, 1968-2000
Variable

Description

Unemployment rate (%)
Inflation rate (fraction)
Actual real GDP (1982 billion rials)
Real GDP growth (fraction)
Potential GDP (1982 billion rials)
Output gap (1982 billion rials)
the black market premium (rial per
BP
$US)
Real investment growth (fraction)
Δln(I)
Growth of real value added in the oil
Δln(OV)
sector
Δln(M2) Nominal growth of M2
Δln(M2/P) Real growth of M2
U
Δln(P)
Y
Δln(Y)
Yp
G

12.7
0.155
11813
0.041
11803
9

16.7
0.401
18701
0.160
18472
2498

10.0
0.015
5104
-0.161
5807
-1842

Standard
Deviation
1.9
0.084
3382
0.077
3134
920

1097

6908

6

1771

0.043

0.406

-0.368

0.172

0.007
0.226
0.071

0.792
0.451
0.307

-1.074
0.058
-0.082

0.267
0.079
0.102

Mean Maximum Minimum

Sources: Management and Planning Organisation (2000); Central Bank (2002); and Tabibian, et al. (2000).

Starting with these I(0) variables, the general-to-specific methodology is now used to
omit the insignificant variables (if any) in equation (1) on the basis of a battery of maximum
likelihood tests. As mentioned earlier, due to the simultaneity problem between U and the
four explanatory variables on the right hand side of the unemployment function (i.e. inflation,
economic growth, and investment growth) this equation has been estimated by 2SLS (two
stage least square) within the following simultaneous equations system:
⎧ln(Uˆ t ) = 1.12 − 0.394Δ ln( Pˆt ) + 0.324[ln(Yˆt ) − ln(Yt p )] + 0.074ln( BˆtP ) − 0.102Δ ln( Iˆt ) + 0.550ln(U t −1 ) + 0.075D
⎪
(5.0) (-2.2)
(2.7)
(2.6)
(-2.8)
(6.0)
(3.7)
⎨
⎪ 2
h= -0.44 DW=2.13
⎩R =0.924
⎧Δ ln( Pˆt ) = −0.03 + 0.689Δ ln( M 2t ) − 1.088Δ ln(Yˆt − OtV ) + 0.003Tt
⎪
(-0.6) (4.0)
(-3.9)
(2.7)
⎨
⎪ 2
DW=1.60
⎩R =0.448
⎧Δ ln(Yˆt ) = 0.041 + 0.181Δ ln(OtV ) + 0.230Δ ln( Iˆt ) + 0.096Δ ln( M 2t / Pt ) − 0.115Δ ln( Pt −1 )
⎪
(3.4)
(9.9)
(5.0)
(1.7)
(-1.9)
⎨
⎪ 2
DW=2.12
⎩R =0.887
⎧Δ ln( Iˆt ) = −0.026 + 0.632Δ ln(Yˆt ) + 1.029Δ ln(Yt −1 )
⎪
(-1.1) (1.7)
(3.1)
⎨
⎪ 2
DW=1.60
⎩R =0.516
*

The numbers in parentheses below the estimated coefficients are the t-ratios.
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Table 2. Empirical results for the unemployment equation, ln(Ut)-1968-2000
Variable

Estimated
short-run
elasticities

t-statistics*

Constant
1.068
5.3
OLS
1.121
5.0
2SlS
Δln(P)
-0.384
-4.7
OLS
-0.399
-2.2
2SLS
G
0.245
3.0
OLS
0.324
2.7
2SLS
ln(BP)
0.074
2.8
OLS
0.081
2.6
2SLS
Δln(I)
-0.092
-3.0
OLS
-0.102
-2.8
2SLS
D
0.070
3.7
OLS
0.075
3.7
2SLS
ln(Ut-1)
0.573
6.8
OLS
0.550
6.0
2SLS
Order of integration of stochastic residuals: I(0)
Adjusted R2=0.925 OLS Adjusted R2=0.924 2SLS
Diagnostic tests:
DW
2.13
Durbin h statistic
-0.44
AR 1-2:
F(2,24)=0.51
ARCH 1-1
F(1,24)=3.3
Normality
χ2(2)=2.1
White
F(11,14)=2.9
F(1,25)=0.59
RESET

Prob.

Expected
signs

Estimated
long-run
elasticities

[0.00]
[0.00]

+

2.50
2.49

[0.00]
[0.04]

-

-0.91
-0.90

[0.01]
[0.01]

+

0.57
0.72

[0.01]
[0.02]

+

0.17
0.18

[0.01]
[0.01]

-

-0.22
-0.23

[0.00]
[0.00]

+

0.16
0.17

[0.00]
[0.00]

β15<+1

Overall F(6, 26) =67 [0.00]

[0.60]
[0.08]
[0.35]
[0.04] *
[0.45]

* indicates that the standard errors of coefficients have been corrected by the Newey-West
Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance before calculating t-ratios. The
diagnostic tests are based on the OLS estimators.

All the estimated coefficients presented above (βij) have the expected theoretical
signs. Since the objective of this study is to examine the causes of Iran’s unemployment
problem, the attention is now directed to the interpretation of the estimated unemployment
equation. Table 2 shows the detailed econometric results of the unemployment equation. As it
can be seen, the resulting residual term from the parsimonious dynamic unemployment
equation is stationary, all the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 5
per cent level and have the expected theoretical signs. With an adjusted R2 of 0.923, the
estimated unemployment function also performs extremely well in terms of goodness-of-fit
statistics and it passes each and every diagnostic test with the only exception being the White
heteroskedasticity test. In order to address this problem, the standard errors of coefficients have
been corrected by the Newey-West heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance
before calculating t-ratios. The estimated coefficients reported in the second column of Table 2

represent the short-run elasticities. One can divide them by one minus the lagged dependent

7

variable coefficient to obtain the long-run elasticities. These long-run elasticities have been
reported in the last column of Table 2.
As seem from Table 2, both the inflation rate and the real growth rate of investment have
negative short-run elasticities of –0.39 and –0.10, respectively. Note also that the coefficient of
the lagged dependent variable is well below unity (0.55). The long-run elasticity for inflation is 0.90, implying that, ceteris paribus, a hypothetical increase of x per cent in inflation can reduce
unemployment by almost the same magnitude. On the other hand, a 10 per cent increase in the
growth of aggregate real investment is capable of bringing down the unemployment rate by 2.3
per cent in the long run. Furthermore, if the gap between actual and potential output widens by
say 10 per, the rate of unemployment will increase by 3.2 per cent and 7.2 per cent in the shortand long-run, respectively.
Now one may ask how can we narrow output gap? It should be noted that there is a
non-quantifiable obstacle facing the Iranian government in relation to private investment: an
antiquated and inflexible constitution. The output gap in Iran will continue to widen if private
investment does not accelerate. In fact, the Third Plan expects the private investment to grow
at 8.5 per cent but one should recognise that the private sector in Iran’s constitution has been
treated as “residuals” (Valadkhani, 2001). The Iranian constitution fails to appreciate the
importance of the private sector in the economy, and this is in stark contrast with the high
expectation of the Third Plan from the private sector.
President Khatami is unlikely to succeed in the Plan within the boundaries of the present
constitution without overhauling labour law and introducing a comprehensive tax reform that
does not discriminate between rent-seeking bonyads (revolutionary foundations supported by the
government and the leader) and non-bonyad economic activities. Iran has been classified among
the countries with the lowest tax-GDP ratio. It is argued that “only 50 per cent of the country's
tax potential is actually collected" (Ghasimi, 1992, p.605). Unfortunately whenever there has
been an oil boom in the economy, the issue of reform of the taxation system fades to
insignificance. It appears that the oil industry has induced a "cargo cult" mentality among
Iranian policy makers.
Since the 1979 Islamic revolution these foundations and a large number of financially
haemorrhaging state-owned enterprises have been exempt and/or have benefited from various
types of government subsidies. As a result, an enormous pressure has been placed on the
government budget. Given that the major source of financing government budget deficit in Iran
is through borrowing from the Central Bank, the monetary base and liquidity has increased
substantially and as a result the Iranian rial became a declining currency. It is interesting to
recognise that liquidity (defined as M2) increased prodigiously from 54 billion rials in 1960
to 249111 billion rials in 2000 (a 4622 fold increase!), whereas real GDP recorded only a 7.4
fold increase during the same period. As a result the black market rate depreciated from 90
rials (per US dollar) in 1960 to 8188 rials in 2000.
Table 2 also indicates that the black market premium, as a proxy for rising economic
uncertainty and mushrooming rent-seeking activities, has the positive short- and long-run
estimated elasticities of +0.08 and +0.18, respectively. Therefore, as expected, the existence of
rampant rent-seeking activities (such as unofficial buying/selling foreign currencies, gold
coins, cars, money laundering) results in higher “official” unemployment rates. In other words,
a volatile and constantly depreciating currency can dishearten employers to create and/or
maintain new jobs in the economy. Finally, the estimated positive and highly significant
coefficient on the war dummy variable clearly supports the view that this calamitous war was
responsible for a substantial number of job losses during the 1980-1988 period.
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4. Conclusion
This paper examines the major determinants of the growing unemployment rate in Iran using
annual time series data from 1968 to 2000. The general-to-specific econometric technique
and a simultaneous equation system have been used to estimate a dynamic unrestricted
equation for unemployment. The theoretical model postulated in the paper explains the
underlying causes of unemployment using stationary time series data. Empirical results
clearly indicate that the following five factors determine the significant variations in the
unemployment rate: inflation, output gap, economic uncertainty associated with an unstable
currency, the real growth of investment, and a dummy variable capturing the devastating
impact of Iraqi war.
It is also argued that creating 750,000 to 800,000 jobs per annum during the next five
years is an enormous task, which cannot be fulfilled without amending the present
constitution and stimulating private investment. It is found that there exists a trade-off
between inflation and unemployment for the post-1979 era. However, it should be borne in
mind that persistent and soaring inflation can easily lead to the depreciation of the domestic
currency, which in turn exacerbates unemployment. Therefore, if major tax and constitutional
reforms are not undertaken in the near future, the goal of narrowing output gap and reaching
higher rates of GDP and investment growth will not eventuate and hence the rate of
unemployment will continue to rise in the years to come. The Iranian government should
stimulate private investment and kick-start the lethargic economy before it becomes too late.
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